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The United States Supreme Court, in Vacco v. Quill, 
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), upheld on 
Equal Protection grounds a New 
York statute making it a crime to 
assist another in committing 
suicide. In upholding the New 
York statute, the Court 
distinguished between refusing 
life-sustaining treatment and 
assisting suicide. The Court 
determined that the state's 
interest in preserving human life 
outweighs a patient's liberty 
interest in controlling the 
circumstances of his death. The 
same day the Court decided 
Vacca v. Quill, the Court also 
decided Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 
(1997). In Glucksberg, the Court 
decided that Washington's 
assisted suicide statute did not 
violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment 
because assisted suicide is not a 
fundamental right. The concurring 
opinions dis-cussed below are 
common to both Vacca and 
Glucksberg. 
Respondents ("Quill"), New 
York physicians, sought to pre-
scribe lethal medication for the 
terminally ill. Because of the New 
York statute banning assisted 
suicide, respondents contended 
that they were deterred from 
assisting terminally ill patients who 
desired a doctor's aid in taking 
their own lives. The respondents' 
argument was based on the 
classification differences in New 
York statutes that allow a 
competent person to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, but do not 
allow a competent, terminally ill 
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person to end his life through the 
administration of lethal drugs. 
According to the respondents, a 
competent, terminally ill patient 
who desires to end his life through 
the ingestion of lethal medication 
should be afforded the same 
statutory protection as a patient 
who refuses or withdraws life-
sustaining treatment. 
Challenging the assisted 
suicide statute as a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Quill and 
three terminally ill patients (who 
wished to end their lives and who 
have since died) sued the New 
York Attorney General and other 
public officials in the United States 
District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. Noting the 
state's interest in preserving life, 
the district court upheld the New 
York statute. 
Quill appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. Observing the 
unequal treatment given to 
competent terminally ill patients, 
the court of appeals reversed. 
The court of appeals noted that 
terminally ill patients may refuse 
or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatments in order to hasten 
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death, while terminally ill patients 
who are not on life support may 
not administer drugs to hasten 
death. The court held that the 
distinction was not rationally 
related to a legitimate state 
interest. 
The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the New York 
statute prohibiting assisted suicide 
violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Vacca, 117 S. Ct. at 2296. 
Chief Justice Renquist began by 
analyzing the Equal Protection 
Clause, which embodies the rule 
that states "must treat like cases 
alike, but may treat unlike cases 
accordingly." Id. at 2297 (citing 
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 
(1982». According to the Court, if 
a legislative classification "neither 
burdens a fundamental right nor 
targets a suspect class, we will 
uphold [it] so long as it bears a 
rational relation to some legitimate 
end." Id. (quoting Romer v. 
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 
(1996». The Court maintained 
that the assisted suicide statute 
neither infringed upon a 
fundamental right, nor involved a 
suspect class. Id. (citing 
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2267-71). 
Next, the Court considered the 
New York statute banning 
assisted suicide (N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987» 
and the statutes permitting 
patients to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment (N.Y. PUB. HEALTH 
LAW, Art. 29B § § 2960-2979 
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997». 
Id. at 2296. The Court 
determined that the statutes do 
28.1 U. Balt. L.F. 53 
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not treat one group of patients 
differently from another group of 
patients because everyone can 
refuse life-sustaining treatment, 
while no one can assist a suicide. 
Id. at 2297-98. Concluding that 
the law applied evenhandedly to 
all people, the Court determined 
that the assisted suicide statute 
complied with the Equal Protection 
Clause. Id. at 2298. 
Continuing its analysis, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the 
widely recognized and rational 
distinction between assisting 
suicide and withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment. Id. The 
legal distinction between assisting 
suicide and withdrawing or 
withholding life support lay in the 
elements of causation and intent. 
Id. Addressing the underlying 
cause of death, the Court 
recognized that when a patient 
refuses life-sustaining treatment, 
the patient dies from a terminal 
illness. Id. On the other hand, if a 
patient consumes lethal medi-
cation, the patient dies from the 
medication, not the disease. Id. 
Next, the Court distinguished 
between the intent of a doctor who 
withholds or withdraws life-
sustaining treatment and the 
intent of a doctor who assists a 
suicide. Id. According to the 
Court, the doctor who withholds or 
withdraws life-sustaining treatment 
intends to honor the patient's 
wishes and to stop performing 
treatment that is non-beneficial to 
the patient. Id. (citing Assisted 
Suicide in the United States: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Congress, 2d Session, 386 
(testimony of Dr. Leon Krass) 
(1996)). Conversely, a doctor 
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who assists a suicide has the 
underlying intent to cause the 
patient to die. Id. at 2299. The 
Court further concluded that a 
patient who refuses life-sustaining 
treatment may not intend to die 
while a patient who commits 
suicide with a doctor's aid does 
intend to die. Id. Although the act 
of withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment and the act 
of assisting suicide have the same 
result, the underlying intent of the 
doctor distinguishes the acts. Id. 
The Court noted that the law of 
homicide "distinguishes between a 
person who knows that another 
person will be killed as a result of 
his conduct and a person who 
acts with the specific purpose of 
taking another's life." Id. (quoting 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 
394, 403-06 (1980)). In other 
words, the law recognizes a 
difference between acts taken to 
achieve a specified result versus 
acts taken that result in 
"unintended but foreseen 
circumstances." Id. (citing 
Personnel Adm'r. of 
Massachusetts. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
The Supreme Court concluded 
by disagreeing with the 
respondents' contention that the 
distinction between withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment and aSSisting suicide is 
capricious and illogical. Id. at 
2301. According to the Court, the 
New York statutes are based on a 
longstanding and rational 
distinction because the statutes 
permit everyone to refuse 
lifesaving treatment, but prohibit 
everyone from assisting a suicide. 
Id. Therefore, the Court stated 
that a state's interests in 
preserving life and prohibiting 
intentional killings bore a rational 
relation to the distinction between 
withdrawing or withholding of life-
sustaining treatment and aSSisting 
a suicide. Id. at 2302. 
Concluding that assisted 
suicide was not a fundamental 
right, Vacca, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 
(Souter, J., concurring), Justice 
Souter concurred in the Court's 
judgment in Vacca for the same 
reasons he set forth in 
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275-
93. Justice Souter analogized 
assisted suicide to the right to 
abortion because both 
circumstances assume the right to 
bodily integrity and involve the role 
of the physician as an assistant 
and counselor. Glucksberg, 117 
S. Ct. at 2288 (Souter, J., 
concurring). However, Justice 
Souter concluded that the state's 
interests in protecting life, 
discouraging suicide, and 
protecting patients from involun-
tary suicide and euthanasia 
outweigh the patients' interest in 
bodily integrity. Id. at 2290 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
Additionally, Justice Souter noted 
the difficulty in assessing when a 
patient is competent and acting 
under his own will versus when a 
patient may be acting under the 
pressure imposed by family 
members or physicians. Id. 
Justice O'Connor, joined by 
Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, 
concurred with the judgments of 
the Court in Vacca and 
Glucksberg, but stated that the 
justification for prohibiting 
physician assisted suicide lay in 
the state's interest in protecting 
terminally ill patients who are not 
competent or whose decisions 
may not be voluntary. 
Glucksberg, 117. Ct. at 2303 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
According to Justice O'Connor, a 
person does not have a 
fundamental right to commit 
suicide. Thus, Justice O'Connor, 
like the majority, purposefully 
ignored the question presented by 
the respon"dents: whether a 
mentally competent, terminally ill 
patient has an interest in 
controlling the circumstances of 
his death. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). 
Unlike Justice O'Connor, 
Justice Stevens, in his concurring 
opinion, agreed with the Court's 
distinction between withholding 
and withdrawing life support and 
assisting suicide. Id. at 2309 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
However, Justice Stevens dis-
agreed with the Court's focus on 
the intent of the patient, noting 
that whether the patient refuses 
life support or seeks assisted 
suicide, the patient is seeking to 
hasten death. Id. at 2310 
(Stevens, J., concurring). The 
differences in causation and intent 
cited by the Court may not be 
applicable to all doctors and 
patients. Id. Seeming to agree 
with the respondents, Justice 
Stevens noted that a state's 
interest in preventing the abuse of 
patient's wishes does not apply to 
a competent person who makes a 
rational decision to end his life. Id. 
at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Acknowledging the 
respondents' argument, Justice 
Breyer's concurring opinion 
focused on the liberty interest of 
the patient, specifically, the right 
to die with dignity. Id. at 2311 
(Breyer, J., concurring). He 
concluded that a person has a 
right to control his manner of 
death and to avoid unnecessary 
pain. Id. Ultimately, however, 
Justice Breyer agreed with the 
Court's distinction between 
assisted suicide and withdrawing 
life support. Id. 
In Vacca v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 
2293 (1997), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a New 
York statute banning assisted 
suicide is not a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the Court failed to 
address the issue presented by 
the respondents: whether a 
mentally competent, terminally ill 
patient has a right to assisted 
suicide. The Court determined that 
the state's interests in protecting 
the vulnerable, the incompetent, 
and those under financial or family 
pressure to end their lives justified 
the prohibition of assisted suicide. 
The Court's characterization of 
the differences in intent in 
assisting suicide and withholding 
or withdrawing life support is 
illusory. A doctor who assists 
suicide by administering lethal 
drugs and a doctor who withdraws 
or withholds life support may both 
be complying with the patient's 
request. Similarly, a patient who 
desires to be injected with lethal 
drugs and a patient who does not 
wish to be administered life-
sustaining treatments may both be 
attempting to ease the suffering. A 
competent, terminally ill patient 
who desires to ease his suffering 
through the ingestion of lethal 
medication, assisted by a doctor 
who wishes to comply with the 
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patient's request, could present a 
strong challenge to the state's 
interests and classification 
distinctions articulated by the 
Court. A court may then be forced 
to decide the definition of a 
competent patient. Because the 
competent patient is conscious of 
his suffering, a court may also 
have to decide that a competent, 
terminally ill patient has a much 
greater liberty interest than does a 
patient in a persistent vegetative 
state in deciding the cause and 
circumstances of his death. 
As a result of the. Court's 
decision, mentally competent, 
terminally ill patients may not seek 
medical assistance in ending their 
own lives, even if treatment or 
medication cannot eliminate the 
discomfort associated with the 
disease. Although none of the 
Justices agreed that a patient has 
a fundamental right to assisted 
suicide, all of the Justices agreed 
that every patient has a right to 
seek palliative care, even if the 
result of such treatment would be 
to hasten death. The Court failed 
to recognize that palliative care is 
often insufficient to reduce a 
terminal patient's pain to an 
acceptable level of comfort while 
allowing the patient to remain 
alert. Frequently, in the final 
stages of a disease such as 
cancer, the patient can no longer 
endure the pain and suffering 
associated with the disease, 
notwithstanding medication and 
treatment. When the suffering 
becomes unendurable, a 
competent patient should be 
permitted to hasten death in a 
humane and certain manner. 
28.1 U. Bait. L.F. 55 
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